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We examine the interaction of commercial media and retail producers of well-known 
consumer products when advertising is used to differentiate brands. In particular, we 
address how competition in the media market affects choices of advertising and program 
quality. The results suggest counter-intuitively that advertisers may actually prefer media 
markets with less competition for audiences. Product differentiation through advertising 
is more effective when media markets are less competitive, leading to higher prices for 
advertised products. As a result, media concentration may lead to higher profits for 
advertising firms if the additional revenue exceeds the higher advertising costs associated 






Recent debates about concentration in the broadcast media industry have provoked 
obvious concerns about the consequences for programming and advertising levels (see 
for example, Brown & Alexander, 2005). What is not so obvious is how media 
concentration can affect the prices of advertised products. By some accounts, over 2/3
rds 
of advertising expenditures in the U.S. are channeled through commercial media such as 
radio and television.
1 This fact suggests that the structure of the media industry and 
decisions taken within play an important role, not only in the market for advertising, but 
also in the competition for advertised products.  
Our purpose is to examine the interaction of commercial media and advertisers 
who are linked, not only through an advertising market, but also through a set of 
consumers who make choices in the media market and in the product market. 
Specifically, we ask: How does concentration in the media industry affect the prices of 
advertised products and, consequently, the profits of advertising firms? 
Common intuition suggests that advertisers should object to concentration in the 
media industry because it typically means higher prices for advertising.
2 We challenge 
this notion by suggesting that media concentration may actually benefit producers of 
branded consumer products despite higher advertising prices. If concentration in the 
media industry makes it less likely for consumers to avoid persuasive advertising 
messages, then advertisers are more effective at differentiating their products and, 
consequently, enjoy higher prices for their products. It is thus possible for these 
producers to benefit from media concentration if higher product revenues offset the 
higher advertising prices. 
This result is somewhat surprising in contrast to typical notions of vertical 
relationships, which suggest that less upstream competition leads to higher wholesale 
prices (advertising prices in this case) and lower profits for downstream firms. The 
distinction in the present context lies in the view that agents here are related in a circular 
way, rather than vertically. Consumers participate in both the media industry, through the 
choice of, say, a television station, and the advertiser’s product market.  
                                                 
1 Source: Leading National Advertisers Advertising Age 2002 and 2003. 
2 Brown & Alexander (2005), using F.C.C. data, empirically establish a positive relationship between 




To illustrate the result, we employ an equilibrium model of the media industry. In 
the model, competing media firms, referred to as stations, provide some service (news, 
music, entertainment, etc.) to a set of consumers and sell commercial advertising space to 
producers. These producers compete for the sale of advertised products to consumers.  
Stations receive their revenues from advertising sales and enjoy higher advertising 
prices when they have a large audience. However, consumers in the model dislike 
advertising since they have, presumably, tuned in to a station for its programming. 
Stations choose an amount of advertising to sell, keeping in mind this trade-off. Stations 
can, in addition, attract audiences by making investments in programming quality.  
An important aspect of the model is that advertising is used by firms to 
differentiate their brand from that of their rival. Much of the advertising seen on 
television or heard on radio contains messages that are intended to associate an image 
with the product. The new “product” is then the physical product along with the 
associated image. Such images seem most prominent for conspicuously consumed 
products, like soda, beer, or automobiles, which are the most heavily advertised 
products.
3 
Broadcast media can be seen as vehicles for these images in the form of 
commercials interspersed throughout regular programming. Viewers or listeners tune in 
for the programming and are subject to the effects of advertising. The strength of these 
effects depends on a variety of factors, which are emphasized in the model. For instance, 
the more an advertisement is aired, the more likely consumers have seen the ad and 
associate the image with the product. Also, consumers’ predispositions should affect their 
acceptance of the shown images. For example, consumers predisposed to Pepsi over 
Coke have a tendency to be influenced favorably by a Pepsi ad more than by a Coke ad, 
and vice versa. Consequently, more advertising by both Pepsi and Coke serve to reinforce 
brand loyalties and relax price competition. 
The media industry’s role in this process lies in the market for advertising space. 
The intuition above suggests that media market structures that lead to higher levels of 
advertising reinforce the tendency to differentiate products. It has been theorized in a 
number of articles that if viewers dislike advertising, then softened competition among 
                                                 




media gives broadcasters incentive to advertise more. (See Cunningham & Alexander, 
2004 or Masson, Mudambi, & Reynolds, 1990.) The same process is at work in the 
current study. 
Our analysis also points out how media firms can capture additional rents from 
advertisers by making investments in program quality. For example, a television station 
makes its programming more appealing to viewers (e.g., with better quality shows). With 
more viewers, media firms command higher advertising prices from advertisers. A large 
portion of the media economics literature has investigated the relationship between 
industry structure and programming decisions of commercial media. Anderson & Coate 
(2005), Beebe (1977), Gal-Or & Dukes (2003), and Steiner (1952) point out how 
programming decisions are driven by advertisers’ demand for viewers when viewing is 
free.
4  
While, these previously mentioned studies address how the structure of the media 
market affects the media decisions of advertising and programming decisions, they do not 
examine the strategic consequences of advertisers engaged in product market 
competition.
5 The current study departs from existing work, therefore, by investigating 
the consequence of decisions in the commercial media industry on competition for 
advertised products. 
The competitive effect in the advertised product markets has been considered in 
Baye & Morgan (2001), Dukes (2004), and Gal-Or & Dukes (2003). This is done by 
modeling consumers’ participation in both the media market and the product market. The 
distinction of the current paper lies in the way firms use advertising. The other papers 
assume that advertising informs consumers of product availability and price.
 Moreover, 
this type of advertising has no bearing on consumers’ perception of the product. In 
contrast, the present formulation assumes that advertising is used to brand products, 
causing some consumers to become more or less loyal to a given product. 
                                                 
4 A recent stream of literature on two-sided markets is also relevant. (See Armstrong, 2005, and Rochet & 
Tirole, 2004.) These works identify common features of a special class of industries (e.g. media, credit 
cards, and retail malls) serving two, inter-related sets of consumers, often with network effects. For 
example, credit card companies serve retailers, who reciprocally care about the number of card holders. 
Similarly, newspapers serve advertisers, who care about the readers, who, in turn, read to learn about 
advertisers’ products. 
5 The consequence of media competition on strategic decisions of political parties is, however, investigated 




  This distinction is relevant for two reasons: The first is the observation that much 
advertising contains no price information. But even if one assumes that, at the very least, 
advertising informs consumers of a product’s existence, it still leaves out a great deal of 
advertising for well-known products, such as popular brands of cola, beer, or cigarettes. 
Such advertising appears to be associated with a broader marketing scheme that is 
intended to create an image to be associated with the product. For instance, images with 
celebrities, sports figures, or fictitious idols are associated with many well-known 
products. This process is a way in which producers differentiate their product from that of 
their rival’s in order to secure more loyal and less price-elastic customers. 
This distinction is also relevant because informative treatments of advertising lead 
to a counter-intuitive result. To see this, note that many models of informative advertising 
suggest that higher equilibrium levels of advertising make more product information 
available and lead, therefore, to more competitive outcomes in product markets. 
Consequently, more effective advertising erodes producer profits. For example, 
Grossman & Shapiro’s (1984) treatment of informative advertising for differentiated 
products shows that higher advertising prices can lead to higher firm profits, since this 
coordinates producers to jointly withhold price and product information, allowing each 
producer to exploit partially informed consumers with higher product prices. This 
suggests that producers prefer a media market that provides less effective advertising 
means. 
This seems inconsistent with observations in the media industry. For example, if it 
were certain that advertising enhanced product market competition, then regulation limits 
on advertising on television, particularly in Europe, would be anti-competitive. 
Other events in media markets have been inspired by the desire to make media 
more attractive to advertisers by offering economies of scale in advertising’s ability to 
reach desired consumers. Examples, such as the merger of CBS and Viacom and Clear 
Channel Communication’s acquisition of over 1200 radio stations, were inspired by the 





6 Theory suggests that this would not be the case if advertising 
were purely informative.   
A basic model is presented in section 2 to illustrate the main result. Specifically, 
the agents and their objectives are defined in subsections 2.1–2.4. In section 2.5, we 
derive the competitive (subgame perfect) equilibrium and interpret comparative statics. 
Section 3 examines the robustness of the main result in light of some simplifying 
assumptions made in the basic model. Finally, the main text ends with the concluding 
remarks of section 4. Finally, an appendix contains technical details omitted from the 
main text. 
 
2 The Model 
The model consists of consumers, producers, and stations. In the first stage, stations make 
programming choices that determine the available broadcasting space for advertisements. 
Simultaneously, two producers decide their demand schedules for advertising on each 
station. Next, consumers decide which station to subscribe to. Stations then broadcast 
programming and advertising messages. In the second stage, producers engage in price 
competition in the product market. Finally, consumers make their purchase by buying at 
most one unit of a product. 
The timing of the model is intended to reflect timing in the industry. For instance, 
television shows are made to fit within hourly or half-hourly segments and have 
advertising breaks that must be “built into” the show. Simultaneously, producers decide 
where to place their advertising messages anticipating how popular each station will be, 
using, for example, the television/radio ratings. Finally, producers make pricing decisions 
typically after advertising and other longer-term marketing decisions have been made. 
We present the model beginning in stage 2 and work backward to stage 1. In the 
first subsection we describe stage 2 by specifying producers’ pricing strategies and 
consumers’ choices in the product market. Next we derive producers’ stage 1 demand for 
advertising. We then describe the consumers’ choices in the media market and stations’ 
                                                 
6 Industry specialists, commenting on the CBS-Viacom merger, cited the ability of the merger to create a 
broad audience as the key factor in bringing the two companies together. (See “They Have It All Now,” 




programming decisions, which also occur in stage 1. The competitive (subgame perfect) 
equilibrium is then derived and interpreted.  
 
2.1 Product Market (Stage 2) 
There is a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed on the unit interval (Hotelling, 
1929). Two producers, one located at each end point of the interval, sell differentiated 
products (see Figure 1).
7 Each consumer views exactly one
8 of m  stations, and we denote 
the portion of consumers who view station  } ,..., 1 { m k ∈  by z
k, which we refer to as the 
viewership of station k. Assume for now that  ) ,..., (
1 m z z z = , a vector characterizing the 
distribution of stations’ market shares, is fixed and has the property  1 = ∑k
k z . In section 
2.4, we model consumers’ choices in the media market, and z  is endogenously 
determined. 
  A consumer’s location on the interval represents her ideal product characteristics. 
Whenever she consumes a product located some distance away from this point, her utility 
is diminished at a fixed rate. Specifically, a consumer located at a distance  i d  from 




i p d t u − − = ) 1 (,  
where pi is the price of product i.
9 The value 
k
i t  represents the degree of product 
differentiation associated with product i among viewers of station k. The disutility 
associated with the mismatch of consumer tastes and available products is measured by 
i
k
i d t .  
Note that 
k
i t  may vary across i and k. It is useful to consider  ) ,..., (
1 m
i i i t t t = , 
2 , 1 = i  as a set of vectors characterizing the extent to which products are differentiated in 
each media segment. Furthermore,  i t  is fixed since each 
k
i t  is determined by the 
advertising choices made in stage one. The specification of 
k
i t  as a function of 
advertising is developed in the subsequent section.  
                                                 
7 The case of an arbitrary number of producers greater than 2 is considered in section 3.1. In section 3.2 we 
relax the assumption that these producers are fixed at the endpoints of the unit interval. 
8 In section 3.3 we allow viewers to optimally mix or “surf” across more than one station. 
9 We specify consumption utility in order to distinguish it from the utility a consumer receives from 
participation in the media market. Consumer choices in the media market are made independently of their 




We now derive the equilibrium pricing strategies for each producer. Product 
demand is determined by finding the consumer who is indifferent between products given 
prices  1 p  and  2 p . Assume producer 1 is located at the origin and let  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  represent 
the location of an arbitrary consumer. If  ) , ( 2 1 p p x
k  solves 
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) , ( + −
+
=  (1) 
All consumers 
k x x <  buy from producer 1, the remaining consumers from producer 2. 
Assuming a constant marginal cost of production c and zero fixed costs, the profit 
of producer i, given  ) , , ( 2 1 t t z  is 
() Costs g Advertisin ) , (






i i p p D z c p , (2) 
where  ) , ( ) , ( 1 ) , ( 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 p p x p p D p p D
k k k = − = . Advertising costs are determined in 
stage 1 and, therefore, fixed at this stage. We characterize the optimal stage 2 price 




Given viewership and product differentiation parameters { }
m
k
k k k t t z 1 2 1 , , = , stage 2 
product prices are  
2 , 1 ) 2 ( ˆ 3
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i t 1 } { =  weighted by viewership.
11 Note that a larger value of product 
differentiation of either product yields higher equilibrium prices of both products. 
Moreover, an increase in product differentiation raises the equilibrium price of its product 
twice as much as the price of its rival’s product. 
                                                 
10 All formal proofs are given in the Appendix. 
11 It is noteworthy to point out the comparison of (3) with the pricing outcome in the familiar, two-firm, 
linear city model with asymmetric transportation costs:  ) 2 ( 3
1




  Finally, observe that different consumers perceive a given product differently, 
depending on how much advertising they’ve been exposed to. As such, the producer 
would like to price discriminate on consumers’ viewing behavior. However, each 
producer does not possess such knowledge and, thus, must set its product price based on 
the aggregate measure,  i T . 
 
2.2 Product Differentiation Through Advertising 
In this section we specify the process of differentiation through advertising. We designate 
the value 
k
i t  as a function of the amount of advertising a viewer of station k is exposed to. 
Specifically, suppose consumers who view station k are subject to 
k
i ϕ  advertising 
messages from producer i. Then the degree of product differentiation among viewers of 




i t t ϕ = . We assume  ) (⋅ t  to be increasing in 
advertising 
k
i ϕ  in order to reflect a producer’s use of advertising to differentiate its 
product from its rivals’ product. Furthermore, this ability is decreasing as consumers 
become more exposed to advertising. Hence, we assume  ) (⋅ t  is twice continuously 
differentiable so that  t t ′ ′ > > ′ 0 .  
  One interpretation for this specification of  ) (⋅ t  is that producers use advertising to 
establish product or brand loyalty. The advertising message may not appeal to all 
consumers uniformly, however. In order to establish loyalty, producers of a product 
choose messages that appeal to those consumers predisposed to their product. For 
example, we can imagine that a product endorsement by a celebrity appeals more 
profoundly to consumers with a predisposition to this product (i.e. those consumers 
whose tastes match the advertised product most closely). This aspect of advertising is 
captured by the consumer utility specification, in which the marginal utility, 
) 1 )( ( i
k
i d t − ′ ϕ , is decreasing in  i d . 
As a result of this specification, product demand is increasing in advertising. (See 
Figure 1.) Furthermore, advertising, by either firm, leads to higher product prices, as 
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Figure 1: The Effect on Product Utility from an Increase in 
k t1  (
k k t t 1 1
~ > ). 
 
2.3 Demand for Advertising (Stage 1) 
We now examine producers’ optimal advertising choices in stage 1 knowing the product 
market outcomes in stage 2. First observe from (3) that the equilibrium product prices are 




i i 1 ) ( = = ϕ ϕ , i=1, 2. 
Then for fixed z , Ti is a function of advertising levels  ) , ( 2 1 ϕ ϕ , as implied by Lemma 1. 
Therefore, we can write the equilibrium product prices as  ) , ( ˆ ˆ i i i i p p − = ϕ ϕ .  
Producers in the first stage choose  i ϕ  in order to maximize total profits 






i i i i a t p p c p ϕ ρ ϕ ϕ ˆ ˆ ˆ ) , ( , (4) 
where a
k is the price of an advertising message on station k. First order conditions for 
maximization imply that the optimal choice,  i ϕ , must satisfy 
m k t



































ϕ . (5) 
This condition expresses producer i’s demand for advertising messages on station k. For 
instance, producers are willing to pay higher advertising prices to station k if it has higher 
levels of viewership, z
k. Also, a higher marginal effect of advertising on product 
differentiation, as reflected by higher values of the derivative t′, leads to generally higher 





2.4 Media Market 
Assume that the m stations are symmetrically and horizontally differentiated and 
represented on a circle of unit length. (See Salop, 1979 and Vickrey, 1964). Consumers 
are uniformly distributed on the circle. A consumer’s location on the circle represents her 
“ideal” station and is independent of her location in the product market.
12 Whenever she 
views a station located some distance away from her ideal point, her utility is diminished 
at a fixed rate of s. The value s represents the degree of programming/station 
differentiation and measures the disutility associated with the mismatch of viewers’ tastes 
and available stations. It is through this differentiation parameter, s, and the number of 
stations, m , that we measure the extent of competition in the media market. 
Since advertising interrupts programming, we assume that it diminishes a 
viewer’s utility. Let 
k Φ  denote the total amount of advertising broadcasted on stationk . 
Then a viewer who chooses station k , located 
k d  units away, receives utility 
k k k sd b v k u − Φ − = ) ( ) ( , (6) 
where ) (
k b v  is the utility of programming by station k  when it invests 
k b  in 
programming quality.
13 Assume that  ) (⋅ v  is increasing at a decreasing rate.  
A consumer receives zero utility from viewing no station and is assumed to 
observe all decisions taken by stations and to choose the station that maximizes utility. 
Note that if  ) (
k b v  is sufficiently high, then all viewers find it worthwhile to view a 
station. The condition  m
s v 2
3 ) 0 ( >  ensures that to be the case. 
Given that the stations choose investments, 
m
k




1 ) ( = Φ = Φ , the viewership of station k is 
                                                 
12 The assumption of independence between the media and product markets leaves out the possibility of an 
advertiser using information on viewing behavior to identify consumers most likely to buy its product. For 
example, sports equipment manufacturers advertise on sports channels, but not, perhaps, on cooking 
channels. However, we consider two producers who compete in the same product category, say Coke and 
Pepsi in the cola category. At this level of product competition, it is reasonable to assume that preferences 
across markets are uncorrelated. For instance, it is unlikely that preferences over Coke and Pepsi correlate 
strongly with sports or cooking preferences.   
13 It could be suggested that, given the present set-up, consumers incorporate product consumption utility in 
their media decision. We simplify the model by assuming that viewers choose their station based on 
programming tastes and quantities, rather than on potential influences over the product preferences. Thus 





s k k k k k k
s
k b v b v b v b z
2 1 1 1 1
2
1 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 ) , ( + Φ + Φ + Φ − − − =
− + + − ϕ . (7) 
Note that the distribution of viewers is a function of the vector of programming variables 
m
k




1 ) ( = Φ = Φ . Station k  can increase its share of viewers by reducing its 
advertising, 
k Φ , or by increasing its programming quality, 
k b . Either action gives higher 
utility to those marginal viewers between station k  and its neighbors  1 − k  and  1 + k . 
Conversely, station k  can loose viewers whenever one of its neighbors reduces its 
advertising or increases programming quality. 
Stations’ profits are revenues from the sale of advertising space less investment in 
programming quality. Fixed costs of the station are assumed to be zero without loss of 
generality. Station k ’s profits are expressed as 
k k k k b a − Φ = Π , (8) 
where 
k a  is the price paid by each producer for advertising on station k . Note that this 
specification assumes that there is no direct marginal cost of advertising to the station. As 
we clarify below, the station incurs an opportunity cost of advertising in that it looses a 
margin of viewers with each marginal increase in advertising. 
We suppose here that stations take into account that a higher market share 
(viewership) yields higher advertising demand from producers. In particular, they assume 
that the willingness to pay for advertising is linear in viewership. Hence stations assume 
the price of an advertising message is 
k k Cz a = , where C  is some positive constant, 
which is irrelevant to the optimal choice. Under this set-up, station k  chooses 
k b  and 
k ϕ  
to maximize 
k Π  in (8) subject to  ) , ( Φ = b Cz a
k k  and (7). 
This formulation of the media market permits us to measure the degree of 
competitiveness among stations using the exogenous parameters s and m . The degree of 
differentiation among stations, s, captures the extent to which stations compete for 
viewers. Since s can be interpreted as the cost of switching between competing stations, 
high values reflect soft competition in the media industry. The inverse of number of 
stations,  m / 1 , has a similar interpretation. However, this parameter can alternatively be 
interpreted as the degree of market power that stations have vis-à-vis producers in the 
advertising market. This distinction becomes apparent in the comparative static analysis 





In order to investigate the implication of media competition on advertisers’ profits, we 
examine the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium generated from the model 
described above. Before doing so, however, we first establish conditions that ensure an 
interior equilibrium exists. 








k b 1 ) ˆ ( =  that solve producers’ and stations’ optimization 
problems described above. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium where 
k
i ϕ ϕ ˆ ˆ =  and 
k b b ˆ ˆ =  for all  k i,.   
The first order condition for the maximization in (8) with respect to 
k Φ  and 
symmetry implies that  m s/ ˆ = Φ . Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium  m s 2 / ˆ = ϕ  denotes 
the level of advertising that each producer purchases from each station. Thus, if we 
interpret the ratio  s m/  as the degree of competitiveness among stations, then less 
competition yields higher levels of advertising. The intuition behind this result is that 
stations can deliver more advertising without a significant loss of audience when media 
markets are less competitive, since station switching is more costly to consumers. Also 
note symmetry implies that each station has viewer market share of  m
k z 1 = , which 
declines in the number of competing stations, as one would expect. 
It is instructive at this point to interpret the station’s other first order condition: 
1 ) ˆ ( ˆ = ′ b v a . (9) 
The marginal benefit of 
k b  is  ) (
k k b v a ′ , which represents the additional revenue from 
advertising sales induced by higher programming quality. At the optimum, the station 
equates this benefit to the marginal cost of additional quality, which is equal to 1.  
In order to obtain explicit expressions for the competitive equilibrium, we employ 
functional expressions for the differentiation parameter  ) (ϕ t  and the utility of pure 





Assumption 1  
(i) 
η ϕ ϕ = ) ( t ,   ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ η  
(ii) 
γ b v b v + =
0 ) (,    ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ γ ,  m
s v 3
2
0 > . 
Note that the parameter restrictions on exponents η  and γ  ensure that these 
specifications satisfy the continuity and derivative properties of  ) (⋅ t  and ) (⋅ v  discussed 
earlier. Furthermore, the lower bound on programming quality  0 v  guarantees that all 
viewers prefer watching a station to watching no station.  
Finally, using (9), combined with Lemma 1, (4) and (8), we can establish the 
existence of the symmetric equilibrium in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1  
Under Assumption 1, if  ) , 0 ( 2
1 ∈ η , then there exists  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ γ  such that for all 
) , 0 ( γ γ ∈  the symmetric equilibrium satisfies the following.  
(i)  The entire media market is covered. 
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m
s
m s t c p
2
) 2 / ( ˆ . 
(iv)  The associated equilibrium profits to stations and producers are 





























The parametric conditions set forth in the above proposition ensure that stations’ and 
producers’ maximization problems are well defined. For instance, the parameter η  must 
not be too large to allow producers to differentiate their product to such an extreme as to 




requirement  ) , 0 ( γ γ ∈ . If γ  were large, then stations could arbitrarily sell more 
advertising space by continually raising the quality of programming  ) ˆ (b v , in order to 
offset consumers’ disutility. 
Parts (ii)-(iv) of Proposition 1 permit us to derive comparative statics associated 
with the equilibrium. Since our focus is on how media market structure affects product 
prices and producer profits, we focus on the comparative statics properties of the 
equilibrium with respect to parameters s and m . 
To begin, consider an increase in media concentration via a reduction in the 
number of stations, m. A decrease in m  induces stations to supply more advertising, 
tending to lower advertising prices. We refer to this effect as the supply effect. On the 
other hand, with fewer stations, advertisers’ demand on a particular station is higher since 
each station has a larger share of viewers. This tends to raise advertising price. This we 
define as the demand effect. At this point, however, it is not readily apparent which effect 
dominates. Differentiating the expression for a ˆ  in (iii) with respect to m  shows that the 
derivative  m a ∂ ∂ / ˆ  is negative if and only if  
0 ) ( ) (
1 2 > = ′ + ′ ′
− η ϕ η ϕ ϕ ϕ t t .   (10) 
The terms of this expression capture the supply effect and demand effect, respectively. 
Obviously, under Assumption 1 (ii) the supply effect is dominated by the demand effect 
and, as a result, fewer stations lead to higher prices in the advertising market. 
  For the other competition parameter, s, only the supply effect is relevant since 
stations’ market shares remain unchanged. As such, an increase in s unambiguously 
lowers advertising price.  
From the above discussion, it follows that the comparative statics properties of b ˆ 
are identical to those of a ˆ  since a given station’s incentive to invest program quality is 
fully tied to the price of advertising. (Recall the discussion concerning (9).) This implies 
that in order to understand the effect of changes in  m s/  on profits, we can focus our 
attention on changes in the advertising price, a ˆ . 
Our main result now follows intuitively. The comparative statics properties of a ˆ  
reveal that the supply effect puts some degree of downward pressure on advertising 




increases). Therefore, as advertising levels, and consequently product prices, increase, 
more surpluses are extracted from consumers via sales in the product market. However, 
because advertising prices do not rise to the same extent, stations cannot capture the 
entire share of these additional rents. As a result, producers obtain a net marginal gain 
from additional advertising. 
Stations, however, make higher profits in more differentiated media markets 
(markets with higher s). Even though higher advertising supply leads to lower 
advertising prices, the condition  ) , 0 ( 2
1 ∈ η  ensures that the elasticity of advertising 
demand is greater than 1. Hence, in equilibrium, advertising revenue increases going 
down the demand curve. Moreover, a higher degree of station differentiation leads to 
lower costs since quality investment b ˆ decreases with s. Higher advertising revenues 
combined with lower quality investment result in higher station profits. 
Increasing the number of stations in the media market leads to ambiguous 
conclusions regarding station profits. An additional station reduces the equilibrium 
amount of advertising per station as well as the price of advertising, thus decreasing 
station revenue. Simultaneously, stations reduce their programming costs as the marginal 
benefit of programming quality is lower. The ambiguous result follows since it is not 
clear whether revenue loss is reduced more than programming costs. 
These results are formally summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2 
The symmetric equilibrium defined in Proposition 1 has the following comparative 
statics properties with respect to media differentiation, s, and to the number of 
stations m. 
(i)  Advertising is increasing in s and decreasing in m:   ). , ( ˆ ˆ
− +
= m s ϕ ϕ  
(ii)  Program quality is decreasing in s and in m:     ) , ( ˆ ˆ
− −
= m s b b . 
(iii)  Advertising price is decreasing in s and in m:   ) , ( ˆ ˆ
− −
= m s a a . 
(iv)  Product price is increasing in s and decreasing in m: ) , ( ˆ ˆ
− +
= m s p p . 
(v)  Station profits are increasing in s:      ) , ( ˆ ˆ
?
m s S S
+
Π = Π . 
(vi)  Producer profits are increasing in s and decreasing in m: ) , ( ˆ ˆ
− +





From this proposition we can state the main result: Softer competition in the media 
market leads to more advertising in equilibrium and, therefore, more differentiated 
products. Advertisers (producers) enjoy higher product prices and higher profits as 
result, despite less market power in the advertising market. The reverse intuition equally 
applies: Stiffer competition in the media market may harm advertisers. 
 
3 Generalizations 
In the previous section we considered a specific, simplified model in order to convey the 
main economic factors behind the main result (in italics above). In so doing, we invoked 
strong assumptions on the number of producers, their fixed locations, and the viewing 




3.1  2 > n  Producers 
Consider the same structure as developed in section 2 except that there are  2 > n  
producer firms evenly distributed around a circle of length one (Salop, 1979 and Vickrey, 
1964) instead of at endpoints of the unit interval. We start with the second stage pricing 
game. Note that explicitly solving for the pricing equilibrium is significantly more 
difficult relative to Salop (1979) due to the asymmetry in transportation costs. Hence, we 
do not derive explicit solutions. Nevertheless, we argue indirectly that the same basic 
result holds. 
Given a vector of product prices 
n n
i i c p p ) , [ ) ( 1 ∞ ∈ = = , it is straightforward to show 
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) ( . (11) 
Summing over stations  m k ,..., 1 = , each of whom has viewership 
k z  as given by (7), 




i ∑ = . Profits to i are then expressed 
 Costs   g Advertisin ) ( ) ( − − = Π p D c p i i i . 
                                                 




Define )) , [ , ( 2 ∞ Π = c G i  to be the strategic form representation of this n-firm pricing 
game, given a matrix of differentiation parameters t. The following proposition gives us 
existence of an equilibrium  p ˆ  in the subgame starting in stage 2 of the model.  
 
Lemma 2 
(i)  The game  2 G  has an equilibrium in  p ˆ  for which each  i p ˆ  is increasing in 
k
i t  
for all  n i ,..., 1 =  and all  m k ,..., 1 = .  
(ii)  For all  m k ,..., 1 = , equilibrium payoffs to producer i in  2 G  are increasing in 
k
i t  for all  n i ,..., 1 = . 
 
Existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed by the fact that  2 G  is supermodular (Vives, 
1990). Intuitively, strategic complementarity in prices ensures that firms have increasing 
and intersecting best response functions. Since differentiation allows firms to set higher 
prices, increasing 
k
i t , shifts the best response function of producer i outward leading to 
higher equilibrium prices.  
Part (i) of this proposition suggests that there are direct private benefits to 
producer i when it unilaterally raises 
k
i t  by a marginal increase in advertising 
k
i ϕ . But 
note from (11) that an increase in 
k
i t 1 +  by a neighboring rival directly erodes producer i’s 
demand. On the other hand, as suggested in part (ii) of Lemma 2, there is a strategic 
benefit to producer i when 
k
i t 1 +  is increased through the strategic complementarity of 
prices. In the symmetric equilibrium of the overall game, the latter effect dominates. 
  Consider the overall model starting in stage 1, which determines the outcome in 
the advertising market. On the supply side, each station k chooses advertising supply 
k Φ  
in order maximize (8). Since advertising supply is independent of the product market, we 
can apply the result from section 2.5 that advertising on station k in equilibrium is 
m s
k / ˆ = Φ . The difference for the n producer case is that this aggregate amount of 




On the demand side of the advertising market, each producer i simultaneously 
determines its demand schedule by choosing advertising levels 
k
i ϕ ,  m k ,..., 1 = , taking 
advertising prices 
k a  as fixed. From Lemma 2, we see that each producer i has an 
incentive to increase 
k
i t  via advertising 
k
i ϕ  until the marginal benefit of advertising on k 
equals the market price 
k a . However, due to the inability to obtain explicit expressions 
for the asymmetric pricing equilibrium of the pricing game  2 G , we are unable to fully 
characterize the existence of an equilibrium of advertising outcomes in the overall model. 
Therefore, we shall derive results that are conditional on the existence of a symmetric 
equilibrium in which  ϕ ϕ ˆ =
k
i  for all  n i ,..., 1 =  and  m k ,..., 1 = . Under this assumption, 
each producer chooses the same amount of advertising on each station:  mn
s = ϕ ˆ . As media 
concentration,  m s/ , increases, more advertising is chosen in equilibrium leading to 
higher differentiation 
η ) / ( mn s t
k
i =  for all producers. Lemma 2 implies that producers 
obtain higher product prices. This further implies that, gross of advertising costs, 
producers earn higher profits. And as in the basic model, as long as producers’ marginal 
return to advertising is decreasing, producer profits net of advertising costs are increasing 
with respect to media concentration. This result as well as the remaining comparative 
statics results are summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 
Let  ) , 0 ( 2
1 ∈ η and suppose there is a symmetric equilibrium of the n producer model in 
which  mn
s k
i = =ϕ ϕ ˆ  for all  n i ,..., 1 =  and  m k ,..., 1 = .  
(i)  Advertising is increasing in s and decreasing in m:   ). , ( ˆ ˆ
− +
= m s ϕ ϕ  
(ii)  Advertising price is decreasing in s and in m:   ) , ( ˆ ˆ
− −
= m s a a . 
(iii)  Product price is increasing in s and decreasing in m: ) , ( ˆ ˆ
− +
= m s p p . 
(iv)  Station profits are increasing in s:      ) , ( ˆ ˆ
?
m s S S
+
Π = Π . 
(v)  Producer profits are increasing in s and decreasing in m: ) , ( ˆ ˆ
− +





Intuitively, Proposition 3 follows from the fact that as media concentration measure  m s/  
grows, there is unambiguously more advertising in a symmetric equilibrium. And, as 
agued above, this implies more overall product market differentiation, higher product 
prices, and higher producer profits.  
 
3.2 Endogenous Location Decision 
In section 2, we assumed for convenience that producing firms were fixed at the 
endpoints of the line. In the basic model, firm i chooses a level of horizontal 
differentiation via its advertising choices, which, in turn, determine the parameters 
k
i t . 
But suppose, in addition, that these firms also may choose the degree of differentiation 
via its location on the line. Specifically, suppose in stage 1, producers determine their 
location before making a pricing decision. In what follows we illustrate that when firms 
have this possibility, they still have the same incentive to differentiate themselves via 
advertising, ϕ , prior to their location decision. 
  Following Hotelling (1929), we reinterpret 
k
i t  as transportation cost associated 
with product i for a consumer viewing station k. For simplicity, assume they are the same 
for each producer so that 
k k k t t t = = 2 1 . Reconsider the location game played by the two 
producing firms with marginal cost c normalized to zero. In stage 1, Producer 1 chooses 
the location by choosing the distance  1 y  from the left endpoint, and producer 2 chooses 
2 y , the distance from the right endpoint. In stage 2, prices  1 p  and  2 p  are chosen. To 
ensure the existence of an equilibrium, we assume consumers incur quadratic 
transportation costs. (See d’Aspremont et al, 1979.) It can be shown that, among viewers 
of station k, demand for product i is  2
1














− + + = . Summing over stations 






























+ = = ∑ ∑ , 
where ∑k
k z  is assumed to be 1. Expressing demand in this way allows us to further 




profits  i i i D p = Π  given fixed locations  i y  and  i y− , (stage 2) equilibrium prices are 
shown to be  
  ( ) 3 1 ) 1 (
i i y y
i i i y y T p
− −
− + − − = , 
where  ()
1 −




T  is a station-market share weighted average product differentiation. 
(See discussion following Lemma 1.) In stage 1, both producers’ profits are decreasing in 




1 = = y y  in equilibrium, with 
profits 2 /
* T i = Π . Given the outcome of this locational game described here, producers 
have the (joint) incentive to further differentiate themselves, say by increasing T via 
advertising. This result suggests, therefore, that any media industry structure that leads to 
more advertising, also leads to higher product differentiation and higher producer profits.  
 
3.3 Viewer Surfing 
In the basic model of section 2, viewers were constrained to watch exactly one station. 
This is in light of the fact that viewers’ switching costs are likely to be low, enabling 
them to easily mix their viewing behavior. In this section, we consider the media market 
when viewers can choose their optimal mix between their two stations. We illustrate that 
the same basic result remains. 
  In the extension considered here, it is sufficient to re-examine only the stations’ 
behavior. The demand for advertising, which is generated by producers, is as before.  
  Consider a viewer located at a point between stations k and  1 + k , who may mix 
between these stations at any rate she wishes.
15 Let  [ ] n x 1 , 0 ∈  denote the distance of the 
viewer from station k and let  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ τ  be the portion of time this viewer devotes to station 
k. Without loss of generality, we ignore investments in programming quality 
k b  in order 
to simplify the discussion. The viewer’s utility as a function of τ  is then expressed by 
( )
2 1 1
0 ) 1 ( ) ( x s v u m
k k
x − − Φ − − Φ − =
− + τ τ τ τ , (12) 
                                                 
15 The technique of mixing differentiated products was originally done in Anderson & Nevin (1989). See 




where we assume quadratic transportation costs.
16 Maximizing (12) with respect to τ  
leads to the optimal surfing mix  ) / 2 /( ) ( 1
2 1 1 m s mx
k k k
x
+ + Φ + Φ + − = τ  for viewer x located 
between stationsk and  1 + k . A similar expression 
1 − k
x τ  can be derived for viewers on the 
other side of station k. Overall, the viewership of station k is computed by summing these 
















k dx dx z + Φ − Φ + Φ = + =
− + + − ∫ ∫ τ τ . (13) 
It is instructive to compare this expression with (7) from the original model. Here the 
marginal effect of advertising for station k’s viewership is  s
m
2 , rather than  s 2
1  as before. 
This implies that viewership is more sensitive to advertising in the current setting. This 
difference, however, is a result of the assumption of quadratic transportation costs rather 
than from the mixing behavior of the agents. In fact, it is readily shown that without 
mixing, the marginal relationship depicted by (13) holds.  
As before, stations choose 
k Φ  to maximize 
k k z Φ , subject to (13). Choices in the 
product market are as in section 2. Thus, we can solve for the equilibrium by applying the 
same logic as in section 2.5.  
 
Proposition 4 
Consider the model of section 2 when viewers can surf, and transportation costs in the 
media market are quadratic. Under Assumption 1, if  ) , 0 ( 2
1 ∈ η , then there exists a 
unique symmetric equilibrium such that 
(i)  The entire media market is covered. 
(ii)  The level of advertising for each producer on a particular station,  2 2 ˆ
m
s = ϕ , is 
increasing in s and decreasing in m. 

























are each increasing in s and decreasing in m. 
                                                 
16 Utilizing linear transportation costs leads to corner solutions in τ , which yield the same outcomes as in 





Note that advertising levels ϕ ˆ  are lower here than in the original model (by a factor of 
m). As previously discussed, it is the quadratic transportation costs that drive this 
difference and not the viewers mixing stations via τ .
17 Nevertheless, the same qualitative 
result remains: More media concentration (higher values of  m
s ) leads to higher 
advertising levels, higher product prices, and higher producer profits. 
 
4 Conclusion 
We have presented a model of the commercial media industry in which producers of 
well-known brands buy advertising to differentiate their products from their rival’s. The 
model shows that, despite paying higher prices for advertising, advertisers may earn more 
profits when the media market is more concentrated. That is, when there are fewer 
stations, viewers are exposed to more advertising, which leads to a more differentiated 
product market and higher product prices. We derived conditions under which this 
additional product market benefit exceeds the higher cost of advertising. 
  The results of our analysis suggest that concentration in the commercial media 
industry may have anticompetitive effects in product markets. Analogously, stiffer 
competition among media may enhance competition among product rivals.  
  The reader should bear in mind that our measure of media concentration ( m s/ ) 
does not necessarily capture concentration of media ownership with multiple stations.
18 
For example, a large holding company, such as Clear Channel Communications, buys 
radio stations without consolidating them into one station with a single owner. Literally 
speaking, the model presented in this article does not directly capture such industry 
change. However, the lesson from our theory suggests that if such a change enables the 
media industry to deliver advertisers’ messages more effectively, then advertising-
induced product differentiation is enhanced by the change. 
 
                                                 
17 Specifically, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4 is generated even if we remove viewers’ 
mixing ability, but keep quadratic transportation costs.  
18 The work on multi-address firms might provide some possibilities for future research in this direction. 




Appendix – Proofs 
This appendix provides the proofs to all lemmas and propositions in the main text. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Producer i chooses i p in stage 2 in order to maximize 
() Costs   g Advertisin ) , (






i i p p D z c p , (A.1) 





k t p p D z + − = − ρ . The first order condition with respect to  i p  is 






k c p D z 0 ) ( ρ . 
Substituting in the expressions for 
k
i D , 
k ρ , and  i T  yields the reaction functions 
2 , 1 ), ( 2
1 = + + = − i c T p p i i i . 
Solving this simultaneously gives the expression in (3).  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Using the facts that  m
s
2 ˆ = ϕ  and  m
k z 1 =  for all k , first order conditions (5) and (9) 
yield the expression in (i) for b ˆ . The solution b ˆ and Φ ˆ  maximizes station k ’s profits 
if the following second-order conditions hold: 
0
) (
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The first condition in (A.2) is met since  0 < ′ ′ v . The second condition of (A.2) holds if 
and only if  0 )] ˆ ( [ ˆ ) ˆ ( 2
2 > ′ − Φ ′ ′ − b v b v , which holds if  
() m
s b 2 1 ˆ
γ




If 0 > γ  is sufficiently small, then the bracketed part of b ˆ  in (i) is less than 1. Hence, 
the left hand side of (A.3) is bounded by 1. Because the right-hand side of (A.3) is 
arbitrarily and monotonically increasing as  0 ↓ γ , take  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ γ  sufficiently small so 
that the inequality (A.3) holds for any positive  γ γ < . 
 
For producer i’s optimization in (4), ϕ ˆ  satisfies the first-order condition (5) by 
definition. The producer’s second order condition is given by 
0 ) ˆ (
) ˆ (






































which is satisfied for  ) , 0 ( 2
1 ∈ η . 
 
To establish (i), note that all consumers/viewers participate in the media market in 
equilibrium if the viewer located halfway between receives positive utility from a 
nearby station k. From (6),  
  , ˆ ) ( ˆ ) ( 2
3
0 2 0





s + − = − − + =  
which is positive under Assumption 1 (i) and the fact that  0 ˆ > b . 
 
The expression for ϕ ˆ  in (ii) was argued in the discussion before the proposition. 
Expressions for b ˆ, and a ˆ  in (ii) and (iii) follow from (5) and (9). The expression for 
c p − ˆ  is a direct result of symmetry, Lemma 1 part (i), and the expression for ϕ ˆ . The 
expression for profits also follows from direct substitution of the equilibrium values 
into (4) and (8).  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The comparative statics results for ϕ ˆ , b ˆ, a ˆ ,  c p − ˆ , and  P Π ˆ  follow directly from 
inspection of the expressions in Proposition 1. It remains to show the results relating 






















ϕ ϕ ϕ . (A.4) 
By (10), the bracketed term in (A.4) is positive. Also  0 / ˆ < ∂ ∂ s b  by inspection the 
expression for b ˆ in Proposition 1. Thus  0 / ˆ > ∂ Π ∂ s S . 
 
Differentiating the expression for  S Π ˆ  with respect to m  gives 
() ()




























ϕ . (A.5) 
Again, (10) implies that  () ( ) 0 ˆ ˆ
2
ˆ > ′ ′ + ′ ϕ ϕ
ϕt t . Therefore, the first term in (A.5) is 
negative. However,  m b ∂ ∂ / ˆ  is seen to be positive from part (i) of Proposition 1. Thus 
the sign of  m S ∂ Π ∂ / ˆ  is ambiguous without further assumptions.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
(i) To establish existence of an equilibrium, we show that  2 G  is supermodular. First 
note that by defining  ℜ ∈ p  as the price sufficiently large so that  0 ) ,..., ( < p p Di  for 
all i, we can specify strategy spaces  p c, [ ] that are compact. The game  2 G  is 
supermodular if payoffs  ) , ( i i i p p − Π  are (a) supermodular in  i p  for each  i p− ; and (b) 
exhibit increasing differences in  ) , ( i i p p − . (a) is immediately satisfied. (b) follows 































 for all  i j ≠ . 




i i i t t t ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., (
1  as parameters in the payoff function  ) ; , ( i i i i t p p − Π . First 
note that the best reply  ) ; , ( max arg ) ( i i i p i i t p p p B − − Π = , is a well-defined function 






i t , we show that the best reply function is increasing in 
k
i t . Evaluating 









































































































































where the last inequality follows from the fact that product demand on each side of k 
can be no more than  n / 1 . That is, 
n t t










 for  1 , 1 + − = i i j . 
Part (ii) follows from the Envelope Theorem applied on  ) ; ˆ ( i i t p Π . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Result (i) is immediate. To show (iii), note that at the symmetric equilibrium defined 
by  mn s/ ˆ = ϕ , producer i’s first order condition from  2 G    
i i i i
i i i








/ ) ˆ , ˆ (
) ˆ , ˆ (
ˆ ;  n i ,..., 1 =  (A.6) 
is satisfied for 
η ) / ( ˆ 1 mn s c p n i = − . This is obviously increasing in  m s/  and 
establishes (iii). Let  i π  denote firm i’s profit gross of advertising and fixed costs. 
Then overall profits are  





i i i i a ϕ ϕ π ϕ ) ( ) ( , (A.7) 
where 
k a  is the price of advertising on station k and  ) , , (
1 m
i i i ϕ ϕ ϕ K = . Then the 
demand for advertising on station k derives from the first order condition for profit 
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The first derivative term on the right-hand side must account for stage 2 pricing 







































































∂ −1 ˆ , are computed using the Implicit Function 
Theorem on the first order conditions (A.6). Note that the first term on the right-hand 
side of (A.9) is zero by stage 2 profit maximization. Computing the remaining terms 
and exploiting the symmetry assumption 
η ) / ( mn s t
k

























ˆ ,  
which is easily shown to satisfy the properties stated in (ii). Inserting into (A.7), we 

































which is increasing in  m s/  for  ,½) 0 ( ∈ η , thus establishing (v). Finally, station 












ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ . 
It is directly verified that this expression is decreasing in s for  ) , 0 ( 2
1 ∈ η . Comparative 
statics of station profits with respect to the number of stations m is ambiguous without 
f u r t h e r   r e s t r i c t i o n s .         Q . E . D .  
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Note that the only difference between the model with viewer surfing and the basic 




the advertising market is then determined by 
k k k z k Φ × Φ
Φ ) ( max arg  for  m k ,..., 1 = . 
Solving this maximization using symmetry gives 
2 / ˆ ˆ m s
k = Φ = Φ  for each k, or 
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